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Real Estate Transactions: Collapsible
Corporations and Related Developments
Edward A. Eisele, It.
EAL ESTATE INVESTORS and developers are aware of the
difficulties with which they are confronted when attempting to
obtain capital gains treatment of their sales profits. A stock trader
may make numerous purchases and sales of listed securities with the
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Umversity, LLB., Western Reserve Un-
versity) is a practcing attorney in
Cleveland, Ohio.
attempts to insulate himself from
happy assurance that his gains
will be capital; similar activity
in the real estate field, how-
ever, runs the very real risk of
profits being taxed as ordinary
income. If the real estate trader
this risk by utilizing a corporate
form of business organization and selling stock instead of real es-
tate, he may be shocked to find a revenue agent alleging a large tax
deficiency on the ground that the shares sold were those of a col-
lapsible corporation. The thrust of the Commissioner's attack in
this area is demonstrated in some recent cases which merit attention
and reflection.
I. THE PURCHASE OF VACANT LAND BY A
CORPORATION COLLAPSIBILITY
Most lawyers are aware that gain from the sale of stock in a
collapsible corporation is taxable as ordinary income.' In addition,
' The pattern of the statute is to first rule that gain on sales of collapsible stock is
ordinary income and subsequently to define the type of corporations which are col-
lapsible. The particular provisions of the Internal Revenue Code with which this article
is concerned are as follows:
A. INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 341 (Collapsible Corporations) [hereinafter cited as
CODE §]
(a) TREATmENT OF GAIN To SHAREHOLDERS. - GAIN FROM -
(1) the sale of stock of a collapsible corporation.
(3) a distribution shall be considered as gain from the sale or
exchange of property which is not a capital asset.
(b) DEFINITIONS
(1) COLLAPSIBLE CORPORATION. - the term "collapsible cor-
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most would consider a corporation which improves and subdivides
land, or constructs Puildings to be collapsible. However, few real-
ize that a new corporation which purchases vacant land and does
little more than hdld it as an investment may also be considered col-
lapsible. The Commissioner has lately urged application of sec-
tion 341 of the 1954 Internal Revenue Code to corporations pre-
viously believed to be invulnerable to attack.
The statutory provisions relating to the purchase of "section 341
assets" were added by the 1954 Code, and it has been suggested that
the inclusion of property described in section 1231 (b) as "section
341 assets" was principally aimed at real estate operators.2 There
are a few very important aspects of section 341 that should be re-
membered. First, the corporation must be "formed or availed of
principally" for the purchase of property "with a view to" the sale of
its stock before the corporation has realized a "substantial part" of
the income to be derived from such property. Second, purchased
property cannot be a "section 341 asset" if it has been held more
than three years.
It should be realized that an asset, such as real estate, may be a
capital asset and hence not a section 1231 (b) asset when in the
hands of an individual, while the same asset can be a section
1231(b) asset in the hands of the individual's wholly-owned cor-
poration. This raises the question as to whether Congress intended,
by the enactment of section 341, to tax as ordinary income a profit
on the sale of stock in a real estate corporation where, if the in-
dividual had sold the real estate, the profit would have been capital
gain. This was precisely the question in Braunstein v. Commis-
sioner.' There, the government assumed, for the purposes of argu-
ment in the United States Supreme Court, that if the apartment
poration" means a corporation formed or availed of .. . for the
purchase of property ... described in paragraph (3) ....
(3) SECTION 341 ASSES. - . . the term "section 341 assets" means
property held for a period of less than 3 years which is -
(B) property held by the corporation primarily for sale to cus-
tomers in the ordinary course of its trade or business...
(D) property described in Section 1231 (b)....
B. CODE § 1231:
(b) DEFINmON OF PROPERTY USED IN THE TRADE OR BusINEss.
(1) The term "property used in the trade or business" means ... real
property used in the trade or business which is not...
(B) property held by the taxpayer primarily for sale to custom-
ers in the ordinary course of his trade or business....
2 See 3B MERTENS, FEDERAL INCOME TAxATION § 22.64 (1958).
3 374 U.S. 65 (1963).
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building had been owned individually by the corporation's stock-
holders, they would have been entitled to capital gains treatment on
the profit from its sale. The corporation was held to be collapsible,
and the Court correctly concluded that Congress did not intend that
an examination be made in each case to determine whether the
corporation's assets might be capital assets in the hands of its share-
holders.
The theory by which real estate loses its status as a capital asset
is that a corporation owning an apartment building is engaged in
only one business - real estate management; the land and build-
ing are used in that business, although not held primarily for sale to
customers. This is the language used in section 1231 (b), and the
Commissioner apparently has taken the view that the same reason-
ing can apply where a corporation purchases vacant land.4 When
one considers that Congress enacted the collapsible corporation
provisions to counteract abuses in the motion picture industry,5 it is
apparent that the law now has been stretched far beyond its in-
tended limits. It has been applied to situations usually considered
to be passive investment arrangements and consequently should
cause counsel to carefully examine the advisability of the purchase
of real estate by a corporation.
In three recent cases,' the Commissioner has asserted that cor-
porations which purchased vacant land were collapsible. In Max
N. Tobias7 the corporation had been newly formed to buy the land,
had leased it, and had collected one year's rent. These facts alone
were sufficient for the Tax Court to conclude that the land was
used in the corporation's business of renting real estate. There were
no physical improvements made on the land, nor did the corporation
do anything else with respect to the property during the year of
ownership.
A group of Denver attorneys made a vacant land investment in
Morris Cohen' and were able to convince the court that in fact the
land was held as an investment. Although rezoning had occurred
after the acquisition, and the owners had a topographic map and pre-
liminary subdivision plot prepared, the court apparently did not
4 See note 6 infra.
5 See 3B MERTENS, op. cit. supra note 2, § 22.55.
6Guy A. Van Heusden, 44 T.C. 351 (1965) (held collapsible); Max N. Tobias,
40 T.C. 84 (1963) (held collapsible); Morris Cohen, 39 T.C. 886 (1963) (held not
collapsible).
7 40 T.C. 84 (1963).
8 39 T.C. 886 (1963).
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consider such activities sufficient to classify the property as used in
the corporation's business. The Commissioner acquiesced in the
decision.9
The Tax Court's holding in Guy A. Van Heusden0 seems open
to question, although from the facts it appears that the case in-
volved a taxpayer who, as an individual, would very likely have been
classed as a "dealer," and who thus sought to disguise a real estate
transaction as a sale of stock. The court went beyond the language
of the statute in concluding that "since the corporation's only trade
or business was to deal with this property the tract was a Section
341 asset."" However, using real estate in a business is somewhat
different than dealing with it. Although the court did find that the
corporation was not holding the property primarily as an invest-
ment, it did not suggest for what purpose the real estate was being
held.
While it is difficult to draw general conclusions from these
cases, it seems reasonable to state that corporations purchasing va-
cant land which is subsequendy held less than three years are open
to collapsible treatment if (1) the land is held for a short period
of time; (2) the land is affected by some type of "economic activi-
ty"; (3) the land is used to derive rental income; (4) the value of
the land is substantially increased by rezoning or the introduction
of utility services; or (5) the stockholders of the corporation own-
ing the land are persons actively engaged in real estate activities.
II. THE "CONSTRUCTION" TRAP AFFECTING
THE PURCHASE OF VACANT LAND
In attempting to treat real estate gains as ordinary income, the
Commissioner has an alternative route to that described above. Sec-
tion 341 uses the words "construction... to any extent"12 in describ-
ing actions which may designate a corporation as collapsible; al-
most any economic activity affecting vacant land can be considered
"construction." In Farber v. Commissioner,3 the court noted that
"the legislative history [of section 3411 shows an intent to equate
construction with anything that adds value to the property." Thus,
in Farber, payments *made for utility connections and water line ma-
9 1965 INT. REV. BULL. No. 22, at 6.
1044 T.C. 351 (1965).
11 Id. at 357. (Emphasis added.)
12 CODE § 341(b) (2) (A).
13312 F.2d 729, 734 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 374 U.S. 828 (1963).
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terials were held sufficient to show "construction" even though none
of the materials had been actually affixed to the land at the time of
the sale of the corporation's stock. In Sproul Realty Co.14 the cor-
poration was held to be collapsible where its only activities were
having vacant land rezoned for a shopping center, finding the first
tenants, engaging an architect, and attempting to arrange financing.
These actions were held to constitute "construction."
It has already been noted that vacant land cannot be a "section
341 asset" if it has been held for more than three years. 5 However,
if three years have passed since the acquisition, but there has been
activity in the interim which has enhanced the value of the land,
the Commissioner may allege that such activity constitutes construc-
tion. He may do so if the sale of the corporation's stock took place
within a period of three years after the completion of construction;
this, obviously, might be much longer than three years after the land
acquisition. It would appear, in view of the holding in Sproul,"0
that the Commissioner could also have taken the position that* the
activities of the owners in Morris CohenT constituted "construction."
This would not be inconsistent with his position in Cohen that the
purchased land constituted a "section 341 asset."
IL. THE PURCHASE AND MODIFICATION
OF AN OLD BUILDING
The broad meaning given the word "construction" by the Com-
missioner and the courts is further illustrated by Revenue Ruling
63-11418 which holds that minor alterations to a building do not
constitute "construction" if the alterations do not (1) increase rent-
able area, (2) change the character of the building, (3) increase
the net income from the building, or (4) increase the market
value of the structure. It is obvious that almost any modification or
alteration of an older building which has been purchased as an in-
vestment will have one or more of these proscribed objects. Every
investor in an older building hopes to upgrade it in some manner,
with a view to its ultimate sale at a profit. But because of this Rev-
enue Ruling he will be committed to hold the property until at least
14 38 T.C. 844 (1962).
15 See text following note 2 supra.
16 Sproul Realty Co., 38 T.C. 844 (1962).
17 39 T.C. 886 (1963).
18 1963-1 CUM. BULL. 74.
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three years after the completion of modifications, if the purchase was
made through the corporate form of business organization.
A similar case affecting the real estate investor is Louis Lesser."9
There, the taxpayer bought a building and made extensive altera-
tions which were required by the prospective tenant. The owner
desired to take as much depreciation as possible and urged that the
building's composite life was no more than twenty years at the time
of purchase. By analogizing to the treasury regulations" and
cases,21 which deny a deduction for loss where a building is de-
molished after its purchase, the court held that the correct useful
life of the building when acquired was forty-five years. The crux
of the court's decision was: "Accordingly, to the extent that it was
contemplated at the time of acquisition of the building... that some
components would be torn out, such components would not have
any basis allocable to them nor would it be proper to take into ac-
count any theoretical remaining useful lives in respect of them."22
The decision seems justified and will result in much smaller depreci-
ation projections when similar transactions are negotiated in the fu-
ture.
IV. REAL ESTATE PURCHASED
INDIVIDUALLY OR BY A PARTNERSHIP
Obviously, the developments discussed above will tend to per-
suade investors to utilize something other than the corporate form
for engaging in real estate transactions. Other considerations, such
as limited liability and ease of transferability of interests, will still be
quite significant. Another factor, however, that must be kept in
mind, is the "investor-dealer" distinction. If real estate is to be
treated as a capital asset, it must consist of property which is not held
primarily for sale to customers or which is used in a trade or busi-
ness. Property will fall into one of these categories if the investor,
1942 T.C. 688 (1964).
20 Treas. Reg. § 1.165-3 (1960) [hereinafter cited as Reg. f]: "when, in the course
of a trade or business or in a transaction entered into for profit, real property is pur-
chased with the intention of demolishing either immediately or subsequently the build-
ings situated thereon: No deduction [for loss] shall be allowed under § 165 (a) ......
21 The rationale of Reg. § 1.165-3 (1960) is best illustrated by N. W. Ayer & Son,
Inc., 17 T.C. 631, 635 (1951), where the court stated that: "the buildings have no
value to the purchaser." See also Providence Journal Co. v. Broderick, 104 F.2d 614
(1st Cir. 1939); Super Mkts., Inc. v. United States, 194 F. Supp. 291 (N.D.N.Y.
1961).
22 Louis Lesser, 42 T.C. 688, 705-06 (1964).
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or members of the owning group, are classified as "dealers."2 This
area has been the subject of a fantastic number of reported cases.24 It
is beyond the scope of this article to treat this problem in detail,
but the following are the major factors that bear on the determina-
tion of whether the property sold was or was not a capital asset:
(1) Was the land acquired as an investment, or for some other
purpose? (2) What were the number, frequency and continuity of
sales? (3) What was the occupation of the seller?25 (4) What was
the extent and substantiality of the sales? (5) Did the owner en-
gage in any extensive sales, advertising, or promotional activities
with respect to the land? (6) Was the land subdivided or sold in
separate parcels by metes and bounds description? (7) Were there
any activities or expenditures to improve the property?
V. CONCLUSION
A corporation which purchases vacant land may be a collapsible
corporation if there are factors tending to show that the land was
used in the corporation's business, or if there have been any activi-
ties affecting the land which constitute "construction." A corpora-
tion which purchases a building that is modified or remodeled is
probably collapsible, and its useful life for depreciation purposes
will be unexpectedly long. Furthermore, one seeking to avoid the
collapsible corporation trap by purchase of real estate as an individ-
ual or partnership should be wary of the "investor-dealer" distinc-
tion.
-23Reg. § 1.1221-1 (b) (1957).
2 4 See, e.g., Jerome S. Murray, 24 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 762 (1965) which con-
tains a good discussion of the law in this area. Compare F. B. Tippins, Jr., 24 CCH
Tax Ct. Mem. 521 (1965), with Samuel Segal, 24 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 1131 (1965).
2 5 Compare Rossiter v. Commissioner, 282 F.2d 892 (7th Cir. 1960) with Gold-
berg v. United States, 63-2 U.S. Tax Cas. 9505 (N.D. IIl. 1963), where one group
of attorneys received capital gains treatment while another did not.
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